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I. INTRODUCTION
Just over thirty years ago, I was a student in Kenneth Culp Davis’s
class in Administrative Law at the University of Chicago Law School.
Davis’s casebook and teaching style exemplified an approach that many
law professors of today would consider too didactic. Every chapter of
the book offered generous servings of Davis’s own teachings, along with
queries that could only be described as leading questions.1 In class, too,
* Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I
appreciate helpful comments received from Christopher Bracey, Kathleen Brickey,
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reuel Schiller, Peter L. Strauss, and participants in the Third
Administrative Law Discussion Forum held at the University of San Diego School of
Law on May 1, 2004.
1. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-
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there was seldom any suspense about the direction in which Davis was
going to steer the discussion. A student who was unprepared to respond
to a question posed to him or her could regularly expect to hear Davis
point out where the answer could be found: “It’s in the book!”
And yet, no matter how freely students parodied his classroom style in
private, Davis attracted large enrollments in Administrative Law. Why
did practically every student at Chicago in the early 1970s regard this
elective as a must-take course? A large part of the answer, I think, is
that they realized that in this course they were in the presence of a true
Authority. In every chapter of his casebook, and on every day of class,
Davis left no doubts about his passionate conviction that the challenges
of inducing agencies to perform their functions fairly and effectively
were important, and that he had a host of worthwhile ideas about
possible solutions to those problems. So what if many of the cases
excerpted in the casebook contained references to the teachings of
Kenneth Culp Davis? Many of them were, after all, leading cases. Such
was the formidable reputation that this professor possessed, and we
knew it.
Davis passed away in September 2003, and this commemorative Essay
seeks to take stock of his legacy. I can still recall Davis’s commanding
presence at the lectern, and some of his favorite phrases have stayed with
me, such as his prescriptions for control of agency discretion: “Open rules!
Open standards! Open findings! Open precedents!” After thirty years’
time, however, I am scarcely in the best position to write a memoir of
Davis as a teacher. Similarly, because I had little contact with him after
law school, others can more reliably reminisce about him as an academic
colleague.2 Instead, my principal task in this Essay is to survey and
assess Davis’s scholarly contributions to administrative law.
PROBLEMS 42 (5th ed. 1973) (“Do you think that one basic need of the non-delegation
doctrine in the state courts is for further spread of the movement toward emphasizing
safeguards instead of standards?”); id. at 473 (“Do you get the uneasy feeling that the
quality of justice for the aliens in the Santos and Jarecha cases may be inferior to the
quality of justice for the businesses in the Crowther and Greater Boston cases?”).
2. See In Memoriam: Kenneth Culp Davis, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall
2003, at 2 (an obituary that includes biographical information as well as colleagues’
perceptions). Paul Verkuil once related that his first article on administrative law elicited
from Davis “a five page single-spaced letter that made me wonder whether I had chosen
the right field.” He called Davis’s forceful critique “a high compliment” and “a rite of
passage for young scholars in the field.” K.C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 511 (1986) (panel
discussion remarks). Although I cannot generalize, a letter that I received from Davis
about one of my early projects for the American Bar Association supports Verkuil’s
account. The following excerpt aptly captures the thrust of the letter: “Your project is a
worthy one, and you have carried it out very well, but I think that all of us have to
conclude that the final product would do much more harm than good.” Letter from
Kenneth Culp Davis, to Ronald M. Levin (Apr. 10, 1985) (on file with author).
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That task is daunting enough! My treatment here will be highly
selective. How could it be otherwise? Davis’s contributions are too
manifold to fit within the short confines of this Essay.3 I feel a bit as
though I had been asked to sum up “the contributions of Sigmund Freud
to psychoanalysis.” If I cannot provide a full intellectual biography,
however, I can at least record some highlights of a most distinguished
career. The passage of more than a decade since Davis withdrew from
active scholarship allows me to aim for a degree of critical perspective.
The world has embraced some of Davis’s ideas and spurned others. I
will comment on some of each. I will then conclude with some short
reflections on what this mixed record tells us about the evolution of
contemporary thinking about administrative law.
II. THE AUTHORITY
Although the subject of “administrative law” was familiar well before
Davis entered the scene,4 his 1951 book on the subject5 was the first
systematic exposition of the field. He then expanded that work into a
much more comprehensive four-volume treatise in 1958.6 With Davis’s
capacity for broad research, incisive analysis, and moral passion on full
display, the treatise immediately overshadowed all prior work in the
area.7
The longtime preeminence of Davis’s treatise and other writings in the
administrative law firmament is, perhaps, difficult to appreciate today.
3. See Writings of Kenneth Culp Davis, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1976) (a
bibliography of Davis’s writings, as of the time of his retirement from the Chicago
faculty).
4. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
614, 615–16 (1927) (noting that “the term has now established itself in the vocabulary of
the United States Supreme Court” and “[h]ardly a volume of bar association proceedings
is now without some reference to this phenomenon”).
5. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1951).
6. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1st ed. 1958). The
second edition was published on a staggered schedule: volume 1 in 1978, volume 2 in
1979, volume 3 in 1980, volume 4 in 1983, and volume 5 in 1984. Hardcover
supplements were published in 1970, 1976, and 1989. (The 1976 supplement carried the
catchy title “Administrative Law of the Seventies.”) Citations to TREATISE in this Essay
refer to the second edition, except where otherwise specified.
7. In a book review of the first two volumes of the second edition of the Davis
treatise, Judge Henry Friendly warmly praised the contributions of some two dozen of
the leading administrative law scholars of the mid-twentieth century, but identified Davis
as the “unquestioned leader” of the group. Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1980).
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Often the Supreme Court not only cited to Davis’s work, but seemed to
take shelter in his reputation as a way of validating its assertions.8 In the
lower courts, where high-volume caseloads naturally put a premium on
the ready availability of a handy reference work, his influence has been
even more pronounced.9 Following Davis’s retirement from scholarship,
the treatise has been revised and maintained, ably and diligently, by his
coauthor and successor, Richard J. Pierce, Jr.10 It is still the most
frequently cited work in the field. Over the years, however, other works
on administrative law have proliferated, and thus the once-dominant
position of the Davis treatise will likely never be equaled.
An example of Davis’s leadership about which I have firsthand
knowledge was his early writing about the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).11 Enacted in 1966, FOIA was a major overhaul of the relatively
obscure provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) on
disclosure of government information. The new statute rested on the
then-novel premise that any document in the government’s possession
should be available to every member of the public upon request, unless it
fell within any of nine statutory exemptions. The relatively brief text of
FOIA invited numerous controversies, particularly about the scope of the
nine exemptions. Davis responded quickly. In an article published in
1967, he surveyed numerous issues of construction that had arisen or
would likely arise in the administration of the Act.12 Today, of course,
the literature on FOIA has burgeoned, and entire multivolume treatises
have been written about the complexities posed by the Act (and
subsequent amendments). As of 1974, however, when I read through the
case law in preparation for writing a student comment on the Act, it
became obvious to me that the courts were treating Davis’s article
(which he subsequently incorporated into the 1970 supplement to his
8. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (stating that “a
noted scholar” supports the Court’s statutory interpretation); Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott,
478 U.S. 788, 798 n.6 (1986) (“As one respected authority on administrative law has
observed . . . .”); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.4 (1973) (citing to
“[o]ne of the leading commentators on standing”); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 273–74 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Davis “has been instrumental”
in showing the validity of delegations where standards have been supplied). Other
examples are discussed in detail in the next section of this Essay.
9. A favorite example is a case reprinted in my casebook, in which the
participating jurists argued at length about the proper interpretation of Davis’s work.
Compare Cal. Hotel & Motel Ass’n v. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, 599 P.2d 31, 44–46
(Cal. 1979) (Christian, J., concurring), with id. at 42 (Newman, J., dissenting).
10. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002);
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d ed.
1994).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
12. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 761 (1967).
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treatise) as the principal scholarly resource on the subject.
Although the main purpose of this Essay is to review Davis’s work
from an academic standpoint, I should mention in passing some of the
features of his treatise that made it a godsend for an administrative law
practitioner (as I once was). The chapters were arranged in a
straightforward plan of organization, and each chapter was broken down
into bite-size subsections. Over the years, displaying a degree of
productivity that most other scholars can only envy, Davis frequently
updated the set with pocket parts, softbound supplements and, as needed,
hardcover supplements. Perhaps most importantly, he wrote with
exceptional clarity. In scanning much of Davis’s work in preparation for
writing this Essay, I don’t think I found a single paragraph that was not
easy to read. His writing contained no academic jargon that an
intelligent practitioner or jurist would find off-putting. It was manifestly
the work of someone who took pride in his prose. Virtues such as these
are sometimes overlooked by many of us in academia, who often have
plenty of time on our hands, but I am sure they vastly improved the
accessibility of the treatise for busy practitioners and judges.
Needless to say, Davis did not have the field of administrative law to
himself. The most serious competitor to his treatise was Louis L. Jaffe’s
Judicial Control of Administrative Action,13 published in 1965. Most
administrative law scholars would probably agree that, as between the
two authors, Jaffe was the more subtle and profound thinker.14 Davis’s
treatise had other comparative strengths, however. In the first place,
Jaffe’s book, essentially a compilation of essays, did not have the
straightforward, systematic structure that, as I have just explained, made
Davis’s treatise such an accessible reference work. Furthermore, the
limited scope of Jaffe’s purview appeared right in his title. His book
was mainly about the complex interplay of relationships between courts
and agencies. Davis’s much lengthier work covered not only that
terrain, but also issues of administrative procedure such as adjudication
and rulemaking, which Jaffe barely addressed. Indeed, about half of the
chapters in each edition of Davis’s treatise were devoted to procedure at
the agency level. Finally, Jaffe’s work was a powerful synthesis of
themes that had been explored piecemeal in the administrative law
13. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
14. For a thoughtful assessment of Jaffe’s contributions to administrative law
thinking, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the Intellectual Underpinnings
of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159 (1997).
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literature for many years.15 Davis’s work, in contrast, was more
forward-looking and directed toward improvement of the administrative
process. I elaborate on his ideas for reform in the next section of this Essay.
III. THE REFORMER
Davis rarely limited himself to neutrally describing the law. He
routinely encouraged progressive trends, by publicizing cases that he
thought were well reasoned or had found good solutions to ongoing
problems. He also raised doubts about other trends, by criticizing decisions
or commentaries that he thought had gone wrong or said something
careless. A talented debunker, he was not shy about telling the Supreme
Court that it was dead wrong.16 In this fashion, his writings undoubtedly
served to shape the law in countless small ways that would be difficult to
track.
On a wide range of topics, however, Davis’s reform agenda was deliberate,
explicit, and vigorously argued, and this dimension of his scholarship
invites particular attention here. I will survey a variety of proposals that
he made over the years, noting some successes, some failures, and some
matters regarding which the law has not yet stabilized.
A. Adjudication
If one had to choose a single familiar concept in American law that is
routinely linked with the name of Kenneth Culp Davis, the choice
almost inevitably would be the distinction between “adjudicative facts”
and “legislative facts.” Davis introduced this terminology in a 1942
article.17 As he later summed up the difference between these two
categories:
Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where,
when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the
kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually
concern the immediate parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal

15. As Judge Posner has observed, Jaffe’s book was the “summa theologica of [the
postwar] era of administrative law scholarship.” Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of
Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 955 n.1 (1997).
16. One of my favorite examples of Davis’s scolding was his slashing attack on
one lengthy section of Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), concluding with the remark
that “[a]dministrative law would benefit if part V of the Ruiz opinion could be erased
from the reports.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 823, 843 (1975). Not coincidentally, I think, Ruiz has exerted little
influence on the law subsequently.
17. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–16 (1942).
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decide questions of law and policy and discretion.18

The core insight underlying the distinction was that the evidentiary
processes of the courtroom are, generally speaking, better suited to
resolution of adjudicative fact disputes than legislative fact disputes.
The purpose of the distinction, Davis once wrote, “is to provide
protection of trial procedure to named parties when disputed facts about
them are to be found, and to allow freedom for tribunals to use facts that
bear on law or policy without using such procedure.”19
The idea has had a variety of applications. One of the most prominent
has been its use in the law of judicial and official notice. In that context,
the thrust of Davis’s argument was that a court or agency can more
easily justify noticing a fact that has not been substantiated in the trial
record if the fact is legislative than if the fact is adjudicative. This analysis
received a measure of official recognition in Rule 201 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The rule is limited, by its terms, to adjudicative
facts, and the Advisory Committee’s notes accompanying the rule relied
extensively on Davis’s work as the source of this limitation.20
As Davis liked to point out, notice of legislative facts has to be
relatively unrestricted, because courts and agencies routinely rely on
hundreds of assumptions about the world every day, even where these
assumptions have not been tested through the adversary process.
Among many illustrations he mentioned were the Supreme Court’s
reliance on extrarecord facts about abortion in Roe v. Wade21 and about
alcoholism as a disease in Powell v. Texas.22 The Court still does more
or less the same thing, of course, and the practice is still generally taken
for granted. A very recent example that is familiar to many people was
the Court’s reliance on amicus curiae briefs filed by corporate executives
and retired military officers in Grutter v. Bollinger,23 attesting to the
social benefits of a well-educated, racially diverse work force. Despite
the millions of disputatious words that have been written about that
controversial case, I have seen no suggestions that the Court committed
a procedural impropriety when it took account of the information
18.
19.
20.
21.
begins).
22.
23.

2 TREATISE § 12:3, at 413.
3 id. § 15:3, at 146.
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note.
410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (referring to various religions’ views as to when life
392 U.S. 514, 523–25 (1968); see 2 TREATISE § 12:6, at 425–26; 3 id. § 15:2, at 140.
539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003).
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contained in these briefs, which of course had not been made part of the
trial record.24
Davis’s position on official notice constituted one facet of a sustained
campaign on his part to reduce the role of trial-type procedure in the
administrative process.25 During his scholarly career, he saw administrative
law evolve in ways that dramatically fulfilled this objective. He was not
the only proponent of this shift, of course, but he was one of its most
sustained and vigorous champions.26 Probably the most important
component of this revolution was the increased use of notice and
comment rulemaking to narrow the range of issues that would need to be
adjudicated at all. This development is discussed more fully in the next
section. But even within the sphere of adjudication, Davis contributed to
a trend toward streamlining. He taught courts and agencies that a trialtype hearing is unnecessary if no facts are in dispute,27 or if the only
controversy is about broad legislative facts.28 He also promoted the
development of summary judgment techniques at the agency level29 and
sternly criticized the application of restrictive evidence rules in
administrative proceedings.30
This is not to say that Davis was a proponent of streamlining adjudication
in all circumstances. In distinguishing between adjudicative facts and
legislative facts, for example, he did not argue that serious testing of
legislative facts should never be a feature of the adjudicative process.
Rather, his position was that this testing, where needed, could usually be
accomplished by means that fell short of a trial-type hearing.31 He
suggested that the amount of procedural protection that a tribunal should
24. A less famous but quite interesting recent example of the Court’s use of
judicial notice occurred in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
This was a challenge to FCC regulations that required incumbent telephone companies to
lease their facilities to new entrants. The incumbents argued that the rules would
discourage their investments in new facilities. In rejecting this attack, the Court relied in
part on the apparently undisputed fact that the rules had been in effect for years without
suppressing investments. Id. at 516–17. The Court’s reliance on secondary sources for
information that was not in the rulemaking record has troubled some administrative law
scholars, but it strikes me as a defensible example of what Davis was talking about.
25. 3 TREATISE § 14:1.
26. Id. § 14:2, at 5, 7 (noting that “[t]he author of the 1958 Treatise raised his
voice against the use of trial procedure to develop law or policy, but could find little or
no support for his view either in law or literature”; however, the “tide began to turn
during the 1970s, with the strong surge of rulemaking”).
27. 2 id. § 12:1.
28. 3 id. § 14:3.
29. Id. § 14:7.
30. Id. §§ 16:3, 16:4.
31. As he explained, Rule 201 does not say that courts (or by extension agencies)
should always feel free to take notice of a legislative fact. The rule simply says nothing
about legislative facts. Id. § 15:6. Thus, the propriety of notice with respect to such
facts remains open for case law development.
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make available to those who wish to challenge a noticed fact should
depend not only on whether the fact is adjudicative or legislative, but
also on whether the fact is important to the ultimate decision and
whether it seems to be disputable.32 For situations in which courts or
agencies choose to resolve a controversy about legislative facts in the
ordinary course of business (i.e., without “taking notice” of them), he
advised them to rely on a similar balancing of several variables.33
Indeed, Davis had interesting ideas for augmenting the procedures
used in adjudication—but these ideas have had less influence than his
streamlining recommendations have. In the second edition of his treatise,
he propounded an ambitious thesis: that the appropriate procedures for a
tribunal to use in resolving a given controversy should be essentially the
same, regardless of whether the controversy arises in adjudication or in
rulemaking.34 One striking corollary of this thesis was his claim that,
when a court or agency intends to formulate new law or new policy
during an adjudication, it should resort to a notice and comment
procedure within the adjudication, in order to solicit input from
nonparties. Davis acknowledged that this suggestion was unsettling and
probably unprecedented, but he invited courts and agencies to experiment
with it.35 As far as I know, none has yet accepted the invitation.36 Davis
predicted, however, that a time when the legal system will recognize the
merit of his idea “will come, even though it now seems far away.”37
One of Davis’s last prominent proposals carried this unorthodox line
of argument a step further. In a 1986 lecture, he argued that “the law

32. Id. § 15:15; see also Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in
Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 46–49 (elaborating on Davis’s
analysis and concluding that the characterization of a fact as adjudicative or legislative in
this context is “helpful, but not dispositive”).
33. 2 TREATISE § 12:8.
34. Id. § 12:5, at 423 (arguing that a written argument procedure should be used to
resolve a question of law or policy, or a dispute over broad and general legislative fact,
whereas trial procedure should be used to resolve a dispute over adjudicative facts or
perhaps a narrow and specific dispute over legislative facts); see also 3 id. § 14:4
(similar); 3 id. Preface, at xiii–xiv (highlighting this theme).
35. 3 id. § 14:6.
36. The judicial branch has no antipathy to notice and comment procedure as such.
It does routinely use the functional equivalent of that procedure when it drafts revisions
of its procedural rules—an overt rulemaking function. The procedures are spelled out at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005). Presumably,
then, the reason for the courts’ failure to take Davis’s advice is that they do not consider
the procedure a suitable component of the adjudicative process.
37. 3 TREATISE § 15:9, at 177.
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made by judges seems to me clearly inferior to statutes and administrative
rules in clarity, reliability, and freedom from conflict.”38 More
particularly, he drew attention to the somewhat haphazard manner in
which judges resolve issues of legislative fact that underlie their
precedential rulings. The briefs of parties and amici curiae can be
helpful, but courts often fall back on their own informal research, or on
outright speculation. Accordingly, Davis called on Congress to provide
a research service for the Supreme Court, comparable to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), to which the Court could turn for specialized
research assistance as needed.39 Needless to say, this has not happened.
Nor do I think the Court would be likely to seek it. Part of the Court’s
mystique derives from the fact that it usually avoids being too overt
about its lawmaking functions (even though it cannot really avoid
exercising some such functions).
Yet I would not write off Davis’s arguments as totally quixotic. He
himself pointed out that informal consultation between the Court and
CRS had already occurred on an experimental basis.40 Moreover,
discussions about the general problem that Davis was raising have
continued to the present day. Only about a year ago, Justice Breyer
suggested in a speech that lower courts (but not the Supreme Court)
should try occasionally appointing their own experts to help out in cases
involving scientific or other technical subject matter.41
B. Rulemaking
One of Davis’s most frequently quoted remarks was his enthusiastic
declaration that the “procedure of administrative rule making is one of
the greatest inventions of modern government.”42 This pronouncement
may or may not have been an overstatement, but a generation of
administrators and judges seems to have been persuaded that Davis had
something of a point. During the 1960s and 1970s, agencies’ use of
rulemaking underwent a remarkable expansion.43 It is not easy to say
how much Davis was personally responsible for this trend. Caseload
pressures alone would have exerted considerable pressure in the same
38. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
39. Id. at 15–17.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Stephen Breyer, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (AEIBrookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2004), available at http://www.aei.
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=840 (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
42. TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970).
43. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal
Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1147–48 (2001).
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direction.44 At the least, however, Davis provided spirited advocacy and
an intellectual framework that facilitated the advent of the rulemaking
revolution.
For one thing, he successfully promoted the contention that an agency
may, as a general matter, use rulemaking to narrow the range of issues
that are open to dispute in subsequent adjudication.45 That proposition
may seem self-evident, at least to a modern audience. In an earlier era,
however, there was at least some doubt that an exercise of rulemaking
authority under a given statutory scheme could supersede the right to a
hearing, or to individualized consideration, conferred elsewhere in that
same scheme. Davis helped to persuade courts to decide, in one context
after another, that various grants of rulemaking authority did have that
effect.46 Davis also drew attention to the practical benefits of
rulemaking, including its broad opportunities for public participation, its
normal avoidance of retroactive effect, and its amenability to political
oversight.47
One of the key features of the rulemaking revolution was the general
acceptance of the notice and comment model of section 553 of the
APA—the so-called “informal rulemaking” model—as the preferred
procedural vehicle for agency rulemaking. Here the Davis influence is
relatively easy to detect, because courts often looked to his analysis of
the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts to justify the
comparative informality of rulemaking procedure. Representative of
this line of reasoning was the opinion of the D.C. Circuit in American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,48 an early leading case that encouraged the use of
rulemaking. Writing for the en banc D.C. Circuit, Judge Harold
Leventhal noted:
The particular point most controverted by petitioners . . . involves what
Professor Davis calls “legislative” rather than “adjudicative” facts. It is the kind
of issue involving expert opinions and forecasts, which cannot be decisively
resolved by testimony. It is the kind of issue where a month of experience will
be worth a year of hearings.49

44. Id. at 1148–49.
45. 2 TREATISE § 8:8; 3 id. § 14:5.
46. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612 (1991) (relying on Davis in
reaching this conclusion); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 628 & n.11 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (en banc).
47. TREATISE § 6.15 (1st ed. Supp. 1970).
48. 359 F.2d at 624.
49. Id. at 633.
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Meanwhile, “formal rulemaking,” a procedure spelled out in the APA
by which agencies could issue rules after conducting a trial-type hearing,
fell into increasing disfavor. This development was, of course, entirely
consistent with Davis’s familiar thesis that trial-type procedures for the
determination of issues of legislative fact should be discouraged. The
eclipse of formal rulemaking was definitively established in the early
1970s by the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Steel Corp.50 and then United States v. Florida East Coast
Railway Co.,51 both of which relied on Davis’s writings.52
Although Davis’s criticism of the use of procedures such as crossexamination in rulemaking generated more than a little debate along the
way,53 his position is no longer controversial. Except in a handful of
regulatory schemes in which statutes adopted prior to the rulemaking
revolution require additional procedures, the notice and comment model
has become standard. To be sure, both regulated interests and
beneficiary interests can still be heard to complain, from time to time,
that one agency or another has promulgated a rule without taking
sufficient pains to inquire into the factual premises underlying it. These
days, however, such complaints tend to take the form of urging the
agencies to generate more (or better) impact studies, cost-benefit
analyses, and risk assessments, rather than to engage in trial-type
formalities.54
Indeed, only a few years after Florida East Coast, the Supreme Court
50. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
51. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
52. Id. at 239; Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. at 757.
53. See William H. Allen, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1149, 1157–60
(1980) (reviewing the second edition of Davis’s treatise); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Book
Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211–13 (1961) (reviewing the first edition of Davis’s
treatise); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 519–25 (1970) (defending cross-examination in rulemaking).
54. A heated debate over regulatory reform in Congress in 1995 neatly illustrates
the evolution of administrative law thinking about rulemaking procedure.
A
controversial bill, sponsored by Senator Robert Dole, would have imposed far-reaching
requirements for cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment of expensive rules. This bill
was heavily promoted by business groups as a means of forcing agencies to use more
rigorous methods in rulemaking proceedings. In an earlier era, those same groups had
been among the strongest proponents of trial-type hearing requirements in the
rulemaking context. Such requirements were, however, conspicuously absent from the
Dole bill. Rather, the bill merely invited agencies to augment public input in rulemaking
by various devices, including allowance of “opportunities for oral presentation . . . at
informal public hearings . . . .” S. 343, 104th Cong. § 553(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1995) (emphasis
added), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 104-90, at 3 (1995). Indeed, the bill went on to provide,
in line with the Vermont Yankee case discussed immediately below, that an agency’s
decision to use or not use any of the listed devices would not be subject to judicial
review. Id. § 553(c)(2)(B).
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extended the trend toward streamlining even further than Davis could
support. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,55 the Court unanimously declared that reviewing
courts may not tell agencies what procedures to use in conducting
rulemaking proceedings, except where the procedures are required by
positive law, such as a statute or regulation. The Court left room for
judicial intervention in “extremely compelling circumstances,”56 but the
severe tone of the opinion plainly implied that courts should be slow to
discern any such circumstances. In short, the Court seemed to insist that
procedural choices are for Congress and the agencies themselves, not for
the judiciary. Davis refused to take Vermont Yankee at face value.57 He
maintained that the Court’s words were “not a reliable guide to the
future role of courts with respect to rulemaking procedure . . . .”58
Indeed, he declared, the opinion was “largely one of those rare opinions
in which a unanimous Supreme Court speaks with little or no
authority,”59 because “the sure-footed, painstaking, and cautious
opinions of courts of appeals during the 1970s on rulemaking procedure
are highly responsible and generally admirable and cannot be abolished
by sweeping and abrupt generalizations that seem on their face to be
precipitate . . . .”60 He never reconciled himself to the Court’s rhetorical
premises.61
Was Davis right to predict that Vermont Yankee would not be
followed? The answer depends on how one interprets the question. The
specific sort of judicially imposed procedural requirement that was at
issue in Vermont Yankee—an obligation to supplement notice-andcomment rulemaking with trial-type devices such as crossexamination—is indeed defunct. Davis approved of Judge Friendly’s
suggestion that a court may properly order an agency to provide an
opportunity for cross-examination if a party makes a concrete showing
as to why that opportunity is necessary “to enable it to mount a more
55. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
56. Id. at 543.
57. See 1 TREATISE §§ 6:36–:37; 2 id. § 7:19; 3 id. § 14:10. William H. Allen, an
eminent Washington practitioner, has amusingly compared Davis’s reactions to the case
to a melodrama, in which the judges of the D.C. Circuit were “heroes” and Vermont
Yankee was the “villain.” Allen, supra note 53, at 1160–63. My more prosaic account
here is quite similar in substance to Allen’s.
58. 1 TREATISE § 6:37, at 611.
59. Id. at 616.
60. Id. at 611.
61. See id. §§ 6:35–:39, at 216–21 (Supp. 1989).
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effective argument.”62 He anticipated that Friendly’s view “will
continue to be the law unless and until the Supreme Court deals with it
in specific terms.”63 That prediction was, however, mistaken. No court
has taken such a path since the 1970s.
On the other hand, Davis accurately foresaw that some judicially
created refinements to the rulemaking process would inevitably survive
in a post-Vermont Yankee world, because the legal system could not
function without them. For example, agencies are still expected to
compile a record during informal rulemaking proceedings, as a predicate
for possible judicial review. Vermont Yankee itself reaffirmed this
requirement,64 although the notion that the APA itself contemplates
review of a rule on an administrative record is historically inaccurate.65
Similarly, the so-called Portland Cement doctrine, under which an
agency must disclose critical technical information underlying a
proposed rule,66 has survived Vermont Yankee.67 The nominal basis for
its continued existence is that Portland Cement is an interpretation of the
APA itself,68 but that interpretation is so far removed from the Act’s
actual language as to make the line between “interpretation” and
straightforward judicial common law very blurry indeed.69
In addition, judicial demands for detailed explanatory preambles to
accompany agency rules have not abated during the years since Vermont
Yankee. Although these demands technically rest on the courts’
substantive review role, which is expressly authorized in the APA, they
62. 1 TREATISE § 6:20, at 543 (quoting Long Island R.R. Co. v. United States, 318
F. Supp. 490, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)).
63. Id. § 6:37, at 616.
64. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549 (1978).
65. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act
and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 754–56 (1975); Stephen F.
Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 419–21 (1975).
66. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 378, 392–94 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
67. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Mortgage Investors Corp. v. Gober, 220 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In each case,
however, the agency rule was upheld, because the undisclosed information was not
“critical.”
68. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684–85 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
69. Some recent cases limiting the interpretive rules exemption to the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000), might be placed in a similar category. The courts have
drifted so far away from the text of the exemption as to invite the charge that the spirit, if
not the letter, of Vermont Yankee is being frustrated. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules From Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 566–
69 (2000) (faulting the D.C. Circuit’s “idiosyncratic interpretation of the APA”). But cf.
1 TREATISE § 6:31 (arguing that courts sometimes should require notice and comment for
rules that fall within an exemption); id. § 6:1-1 (Supp. 1989) (same).
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are in tension with Vermont Yankee, as Davis recognized.70 As a
practical matter, the agency’s need to prepare a painstaking analysis of a
rule in order to survive so-called “hard look” judicial review inevitably
augments an agency’s obligations in creating the rule. Indeed, this sort
of pressure on the agencies is at best a mixed blessing, according to
modern scholars who have lamented a trend toward “ossification” of the
rulemaking process. Their claim is that a combination of pressures on
the rulemaking process, including the need to write explanations that can
withstand hard look review, has made agencies increasingly reluctant—or
even unable—to pursue their programs effectively through rulemaking.71
It seems fair to say, however, that Davis never discerned such a
tendency—or if he did, never acknowledged it as a problem. His
attitude toward hard look review was essentially benign. To judge from
the courts’ adherence to hard look techniques, the federal judiciary
seems to agree with Davis as to the ongoing need for such controls.72
In short, Davis never lost his appreciation for the notion of courts and
agencies as collaborators in the continuing evolution of rulemaking. Ten
years after his famous “greatest invention” remark, he wrote that, largely
because of the courts’ continuing involvement, “[w]hat was one of the
greatest inventions of modern government in 1970 has been vastly
improved!”73 The collision between this attitude and the jurisprudential
assumptions reflected in Vermont Yankee is a theme to which I will
return at the end of this Essay.
I should also mention one other rulemaking development that has been
shaped by Davis’s writing. In Ass’n of National Advertisers, Inc. (ANA)
v. FTC,74 the D.C. Circuit declared that an agency official who
participates in a rulemaking proceeding should not be held to the same
strict standards of disqualification for prejudgment as would be enforced
70. TREATISE §§ 6:35–:39, at 216–17 (Supp. 1989).
71. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412, 1419–20 (1992) (arguing that agencies
“prepare for the worst-case scenario” on judicial review by devoting resources to
compiling a record of their decision). See generally William S. Jordan, III, Ossification
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency
Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
393, 393–95 (2000) (surveying the literature).
72. For one prominent jurist’s skeptical response to the “ossification” critique, see
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 662–
63 (1997).
73. 1 TREATISE § 6:1, at 448.
74. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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in an adjudicative proceeding. In the rulemaking context, the court said,
a much looser test should apply: the official should be disqualified “only
when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the agency
member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the
disposition of the proceeding.”75 In explaining this lenient (if not utterly
toothless) standard, the court harked back to Davis’s distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts.76 As the court argued, “legislative
facts are crucial to the prediction of future events and to the evaluation
of certain risks, both of which are inherent in administrative
policymaking.”77 As part of the policymaking process, the court
continued, an official must be able to consult freely and continuously
with affected interests, voicing tentative opinions and soliciting their
reactions to those opinions:
The [ideal] of a neutral and detached adjudicator is simply an inapposite role
model for an administrator who must translate broad statutory commands into
concrete social policies. If an agency official is to be effective he must engage
in debate and discussion about the policy matters before him.
....
. . . That discussion necessarily involves the broad, general characterizations
of reality that we label legislative fact.78

The ANA opinion has been controversial,79 but its legal principles have
endured down to the present day.80 This is not the place to evaluate the
controversy in detail. For my purposes, the main significance of ANA is
that it illustrates one way in which Davis’s famous distinction between
adjudicative and legislative facts has proved useful outside the specific
context of factfinding procedures, as judges have worked to liberate
modern administrative policymaking from the constraints suggested by
traditional norms of adjudication.

75. Id. at 1170.
76. Id. at 1161–62. The court noted, with citations to eleven cases, that the
distinction has been widely accepted. Id. at 1162 n.20.
77. Id. at 1162.
78. Id. at 1168–70.
79. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Rulemaking “Due Process”:
An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 215–37 (1981). The court’s decision
was more than a little audacious, because Congress had bestowed certain limited rights
to cross-examination upon persons participating in the particular rulemaking function
involved in that case (consumer protection rulemaking by the Federal Trade
Commission). Notwithstanding Congress’s partial endorsement of trial-type hearings in
this context, the court insisted that the proceeding at hand was unambiguously
rulemaking and triggered only the lenient disqualification standard that would otherwise
apply to rulemaking. ANA, 627 F.2d at 1159–61.
80. See, e.g., PLMRS Narrowband Corp. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (quoting and following ANA, 627 F.2d at 1170).
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C. Control of Discretion
Not content with having established himself as the leading commentator
on administrative law within the conventionally understood boundaries
of that field, Davis ventured into largely unexplored territory in his 1969
book Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry.81 The book had an
ambitious goal: to explore the role of discretion throughout government,
particularly in the executive branch, and to suggest ways in which its
excesses could be curbed. It was concerned primarily, though not
exclusively, with highly informal decisions affecting individuals, at the
least rule-constrained end of the spectrum of administrative activity.82 In
line with this theme, Davis raised questions about the capacity of the
legal system to circumscribe the discretion of governmental figures who
operate largely outside the framework of standard administrative law
constraints, “such as police, prosecutors, welfare agencies, selective
service boards, parole boards, prison administrators, and the
Immigration Service, where the usual quality of justice is relatively
low.”83 He acknowledged that discretionary action is “indispensable for
individualization of justice,”84 but he called on the legal system to ensure
that discretion will be “properly confined, structured, and checked.”85
Discretionary Justice was daring, provocative, and probably extreme
in some of its arguments. For example, I suspect that few of us would
subscribe to Davis’s condemnation of the “flagrantly lawless” discretion
that police departments exercise when they generally refrain from
enforcing criminal prohibitions against jaywalking and social gambling.86
Nevertheless, the book was full of interesting ideas. It quickly became,
and has remained, a fruitful source of academic debate.
When he succeeded Davis as author of the Administrative Law
Treatise, Richard Pierce drastically shortened the amount of space that
Davis had devoted to control of discretion. The discussion in Davis’s
second edition, incorporating much of the analysis that had earlier

81. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969) (hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE).
82. Id. at 5–6.
83. Id. at 216.
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id. at 26.
86. Id. at 84–86. To be fair to Davis, he did acknowledge, three chapters later, that
substantially full enforcement of a criminal code would be unthinkable in the absence of
reform of existing criminal statutes. Id. at 164 n.4.
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appeared in Discretionary Justice, extended over 148 pages.87 Pierce cut
this coverage to twenty-three pages.88 To some extent, of course, this
reduction in coverage must have reflected differences in the two authors’
respective intellectual tastes. In all likelihood, however, Pierce’s
decision also rested on a sound recognition that the development of the
law in this area has fallen far short of what Davis had hoped.
Among the book’s doctrinal suggestions, probably none has been
more widely discussed than Davis’s proposal for a revised approach to
the “non-delegation doctrine.”89 Davis presented his idea in rudimentary
form in Discretionary Justice and elaborated on it in a law review article
published at about the same time.90 His point of departure was an
assertion that the classic version of the non-delegation doctrine has been
almost a complete failure. The doctrine purportedly requires that every
statute that confers power on administrators must contain meaningful
standards. In practice, however, courts do not enforce this requirement.91
Indeed, Davis continued, they have had good reasons not to do so,
because legislators often have neither the time, nor the expertise, nor the
level of consensus that the enactment of meaningful standards would
require.92 Davis proposed, therefore, that the non-delegation doctrine
should be reinterpreted, so that the task of articulating standards should
rest with agencies rather than courts. Ultimately, he thought, the
doctrine should “grow into a requirement that administrators must strive
to do as much as they reasonably can do to develop and to make known
the needed confinements of discretionary power through standards,
principles, and rules.”93
Davis’s idea that the applicability of the non-delegation doctrine
should depend, at least in part, on the presence or absence of standards
enunciated at the administrative level won some support in decisions of
state courts94 and lower federal courts.95 No member of the Supreme
87. 2 TREATISE chs. 8–9.
88. 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 10, at §§ 17.1–.4. Moreover, Pierce devoted
part of this reduced discussion to analyzing ways in which courts have, in his view, gone
too far in curtailing agencies’ discretion. Id. § 17.1, at 98–101.
89. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 44–51, 58–59, 220–21. Most writers today would
omit the hyphen in “non-delegation,” but for purposes of this Essay I follow the Davis
orthography. According to a piece of folklore that I heard when I was on the staff of the
University of Chicago Law Review, the editors of the Review once tried to alter the
hyphenization in an article of Davis’s. They relied on the Chicago Manual of Style, but
Davis overruled them by pointing to a higher authority: the Administrative Law Treatise.
90. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713
(1969).
91. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 44–45.
92. Id. at 45–49.
93. Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
94. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees
Ass’n, 839 P.2d 1080, 1086 n.12 (Alaska 1992); Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v.

332

LEVIN

[VOL. 42: 315, 2005]

4/7/2005 10:51 AM

Administrative Law Legacy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Court ever embraced it, however, and recently, in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns,96 the Court squarely rejected it. Although the Court
did not refer to Davis by name, the uncompromising tone of its opinion
appears to confirm that the Davis theory has no future in federal law. A
related and more general point can also be made: federal courts have
almost uniformly refused to direct agencies to structure their discretionary
actions through rulemaking,97 notwithstanding calls by Davis98 and
others for a more active supervisory stance. The doctrinal foundations
for this refusal were laid before Vermont Yankee,99 but that case has
probably reinforced the courts’ resistance to issuing mandates of this
kind.100
As I mentioned, however, the main focus of Discretionary Justice was
on enclaves of government action in which discretion has been
particularly unconstrained. How much have the conditions that Davis
spotlighted been alleviated? My sense is that progress in taming
discretion in these areas has been modest.
For one thing, Davis was deeply concerned about the absence of
checks on government decisions about who should be prosecuted or not
prosecuted for various crimes.101 Today, however, broad prosecutorial
discretion remains a reality.102 At the federal level, one can point to a
number of guidelines, manuals, and the like, which are intended to
structure decisionmaking by individual criminal prosecutors. This is
progress of a sort. These guidance documents, however, are typically
not mandatory, and they often are worded in highly general terms.103
Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 350 n.13 (Minn. 1984).
95. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971);
cf. Int’l Union UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317–18 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
96. 531 U.S. 457, 477–78 (2001).
97. William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 365–76 (2000) (collecting federal
case law and citing none decided in the past twenty years that has required rulemaking).
98. 2 TREATISE §§ 7:24–:26; DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 57–58.
99. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290–92 (1974); SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947).
100. At the state level, however, the record is again more mixed. See MICHAEL
ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.2.2 (2d ed. 1998)
(surveying various states’ experiences with required rulemaking).
101. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 188–214.
102. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (upholding the
government’s prosecutorial discretion in the context of prosecutions for draft evasion).
103. For a survey of these policies, see Michael Edmund O’Neill, When
Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 221, 227–49 (2003).
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Thus, individual prosecutors retain broad freedom to decide which
criminal cases to bring, constrained only occasionally by supervision
from above. Meanwhile, in the related sphere of regulatory enforcement,
the situation might be said to have gotten worse from Davis’s point of
view. In its 1985 decision in Heckler v. Chaney,104 the Supreme Court
laid down a general rule that exercises of administrative enforcement
discretion are presumptively unreviewable.105 The body of case law that
has grown up around Chaney is complex. As a rough generalization,
however, enforcement discretion is frequently reviewable when the
challenger can point to statutory or other legal constraints impinging on
the agency; but in the absence of such constraints (which is the usual
situation), the agency’s discretionary choices are not reviewable, even
for abuse of discretion.106
Another of Davis’s prominent proposals was that police departments
should use rulemaking to structure their officers’ discretionary decisions
about what criminal provisions to enforce, and against whom. He was
so taken with this idea that he published a followup book in 1975, Police
Discretion, largely for the purpose of advocating it.107 Yet, although
Davis’s idea has been the subject of much subsequent scholarly
discussion, it has not really flourished.108 One reason may be that police
rulemaking is out of step with certain recently emergent trends in
criminal justice administration, which rest on the view that police
discretion is not such a bad thing. Among these trends are “community
policing,” which contemplates creative adaptation to neighborhood
conditions, and “order maintenance” policing, under which officers
enforce laws against relatively minor crimes such as littering and public
drunkenness in many—but not all—situations. Both of these approaches
require individual police officers to make numerous judgment calls.109
104. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
105. Id. at 832.
106. See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 752–62 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985).
107. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975).
108. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1271–79 (2002). For a slightly more upbeat appraisal,
see Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 14–
17 (2003).
109. For a lengthy discussion of the literature on these developments, see David
Cole, Foreword—Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060–61, 1063–70 (1999). Cole
himself is highly critical of the “new discretion.” For a more positive assessment of the
recent trends, see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword—The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). See also Harold E. Pepinsky, Better
Living Through Police Discretion, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (Autumn 1984)
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To be sure, these broadly discretionary approaches can potentially coexist
with measures that circumscribe discretion, including police rulemaking.110
Nevertheless, it seems at least plausible to suppose that their salience has
tended to erode the intellectual climate that once seemed likely to lead to
substantial curbs on police discretion in accordance with Davis’s
teachings.
The case of sentencing discretion presents a very different story. For
about two decades, following the enactment of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984,111 the wide-open discretion once exercised by sentencing
judges in the federal courts gave way to highly constrained
decisionmaking under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Davis hailed
the advent of these guidelines as a major advance in the taming of
uncontrolled discretion.112 Other observers, however, would more likely
have seen this development as an illustration of the adage “beware of
getting what you ask for.” The Guidelines came to be regarded, especially
in numerous judicial chambers, as having constrained judges’ discretion
too much.113 The complaints became especially fervent in the wake of
Congress’s enactment in 2003 of the so-called Feeney Amendment,
which tied judges’ hands even more tightly than before.114 To be sure,
many of the objections to the stringent sentences that had been imposed
under the Guidelines were directed primarily at mandatory minimum
(arguing, in opposition to Davis’s views, that the proper solution is to augment officers’
accountability rather than to reduce their discretion).
110. Indeed, Kahan and Meares have argued that these two types of police reforms
can be mutually reinforcing. In their defense of Chicago’s antiloitering ordinance, which
they lauded as a necessary tool to enable police to clear criminal street gangs from
besieged neighborhoods, they emphasized that the city had adopted internal guidelines to
structure police officers’ discretion in enforcing the ordinance. Kahan & Meares, supra
note 109, at 1183. In that regard, their reasoning was entirely in sync with the Davis
program. When, however, the Supreme Court later struck down the ordinance as
unconstitutionally vague, it brushed aside the city’s guidelines in a single paragraph,
deeming them insufficient to cure the due process problems with the ordinance. City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 48–49, 63–64 (1999).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000).
112. TREATISE § 8:1-1 (Supp. 1989).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 964–67 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Edwards, J., concurring); KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (making a vigorous attack on
the guidelines).
114. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667–76; Stephanos Bibas,
The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea
Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295–97 (2004) (summarizing the amendment’s
provisions).
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sentences prescribed by Congress, rather than at anything inherent in the
nature of a relatively determinate sentencing system.115 Yet that distinction
may be too facile. It is scarcely surprising that, once a system for
regularizing criminal sentences through publicly visible rules had been
put into place, the system elicited legislative moves to bring those
sentences into line with contemporary political pressures to crack down
on crime.116 Perhaps more to the point, the diminution in sentencing
judges’ discretion that was wrought by the guidelines was offset to a
considerable degree by discretion exercised by prosecutors, who acquired
more leverage with which to negotiate plea bargains to their liking than
they had possessed before the guidelines existed.117 From that standpoint,
the success of the guidelines experiment became questionable, even in
relation to Davis’s own objective of curbing excessive discretion.118
Early this year, the Guidelines met their own day of judgment and
barely escaped a death sentence. In United States v. Booker,119 the Court
held that the district courts’ use of the Guidelines to increase sentences
on the basis of judicially determined facts was unconstitutional.120
Although this holding rested on the right to jury trial and not on any
overt policy critique of the Guidelines, it presumably was symptomatic
of an underlying disenchantment with determinate sentencing schemes
as they had come to be implemented. Through creative statutory
interpretation, a majority of the Court managed to avoid nullifying the
Guidelines in their entirety. Instead the Court ruled that district judges
must treat them as merely advisory, subject to significant appellate
review.121 How this directive will play out in practice remains to be
115. For example, Justice Kennedy lamented in a 2003 speech that “the guidelines
were, and are, necessary [but] the compromise that led to the guidelines led also to an
increase in the length of prison terms. . . . In too many cases, mandatory minimum
sentences are unwise and unjust.” Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
116. Cf. TREATISE § 6.15, at 284–85 (1st ed. Supp. 1970) (observing that
rulemaking facilitates legislative supervision of policymaking, whereas policymaking
through adjudication is more likely to escape such influence).
117. See Harrington, 947 F.2d at 964–66 & nn.3–6 (Edwards, J., concurring);
Bibas, supra note 114, at 301 (“More and more, judges have less power to deal and
prosecutors have more.”); cf. Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three
Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 557–61 (1992) (finding circumvention of
guidelines by prosecutors in a minority of cases).
118. See Kennedy, supra note 115 (“[A] transfer of sentencing discretion from a
judge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much older than the defendant, is
misguided. . . . Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the
prosecutors.”).
119. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
120. Id. at 746–56 (Stevens, J.).
121. Id. at 764–68 (Breyer, J.).
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seen, but the Booker decision obviously portends a major comeback for
discretion in criminal sentencing.
D. Judicial Review
Davis was one of our era’s most vigorous and effective proponents of
liberal judicial review of administrative action. I have already
mentioned his support for “hard look” review of agency actions on the
merits. In this section I will focus on his contributions to the law that
governs access to the courts. Davis’s general attitude on this subject was
reflected in a provocative passage in Discretionary Justice:
Among the government’s legal staffs are many specialists in the technicalities
of such doctrines as ripeness, standing, forms of proceedings, government and
officer immunity from liability, and unreviewability. Year in and year out these
government lawyers keep concocting intricacies within intricacies, trying to
persuade courts to adopt them, and often succeeding. . . . I agree that something
in the nature of such doctrines is essential for an orderly system and to limit
courts to tasks appropriate for them. But from the standpoint of a good system
of justice, the extreme complexity is much more harmful than it is helpful.
....
If Congress, the President, or top legal officers were to direct that lawyers
defending suits against the government are not to interpose technical defenses in
cases that seem meritorious unless the policy behind the technical defense is
important as applied, the total amount of uncorrected injustice from
governmental action would unquestionably be drastically reduced, with no
offsetting disadvantage. The result would not be the payment of taxpayers’
money to undeserving plaintiffs. The worst that could happen from a mistake of
a government lawyer in failing to use a technical defense would be that a court
would decide the case on its merits.122

To anyone who has become accustomed to the Rehnquist Court’s
propensity to exalt these “technical defenses,” Davis’s expansive sentiments
may sound positively startling.
This is not to say that Davis favored broad rather than narrow
opportunities for judicial review in all circumstances. As the quotation
indicates, he could see that some types of agency action are
inappropriate for judicial supervision. Indeed, this awareness gave rise
to what I have elsewhere called “probably the longest—and possibly the
most vitriolic—debate in the history of law reviews,”123 as Raoul Berger
argued in a series of four articles that every administrative action must at
least be judicially reviewable for abuse of discretion, and Davis
122.
123.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE at 158, 161 (emphasis omitted).
Levin, supra note 106, at 695.
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responded in four more articles, criticizing Berger’s contention as too
simplistic.124 Nevertheless, Davis had little regard for generalized judicial
restraint notions. He supported substantial relaxation of barriers to
judicial review, and he exerted considerable influence in that direction.
One example of that influence was his role in furthering the legislative
abolition of sovereign immunity in suits for specific relief.125 Davis
chaired an ABA committee that prevailed on Congress to enact this
reform.126 To be sure, sovereign immunity had many other detractors,127
but the importance of Davis’s advocacy is easy to document. In addition
to citing the ABA endorsement,128 the congressional committees that
sponsored the measure relied directly on a letter that Davis had submitted
for the legislative record.129 The same legislation also eliminated the
amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases in which
the United States was the defendant,130 and the congressional committees
quoted Davis in support of this action as well.131
Within the sphere of judicially developed doctrine, the preeminent
example of Davis’s impact on judicial review concerns the law of
standing—i.e., the principles that determine which persons are entitled
to go to court to challenge a given administrative action. He argued in
the 1958 edition of his treatise that the touchstone of standing should be
whether the plaintiff has been “adversely affected in fact.”132 Too often,
he thought, the courts had denied standing to people who had actually
been injured by a government action, because they had been unable to
allege an infringement of the requisite “legal right,” that is, to show that
the kinds of injuries they had suffered or were likely to suffer were ones
124. See Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J.
965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing eight previous installments).
125. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2721) 6121 (codified in
relevant part at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (2000)).
126. 95 ABA ANN. REP. 342, 346 (1970) (identifying Davis as leading the ABA’s
support for the legislation, in his capacity as Chairman of the Judicial Review Committee
of the ABA Section of Administrative Law).
127. The proposal was cosponsored by the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS). One also cannot overstate the significance of the fact that the Justice
Department (led on this issue by Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia) supported
the measure.
128. S. REP. No. 94-996, at 3 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 4 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121, 6124.
129. S. REP. No. 94-996, at 7, 10 n.33; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 8, 10 n.33. For
the text of the letter, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure
Act, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 35, 47–48 (1977).
130. This measure predated by four years the elimination of the amount in
controversy requirement for all federal question cases.
See Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
131. S. REP. NO. 94-996, at 16; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 17.
132. 3 TREATISE § 22.02, at 213 (1st ed. 1958).
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that the courts should protect.133 A fairer and much simpler solution, he
concluded, would be to recognize “the principle of elementary justice
that one who is in fact hurt by illegal action should have a remedy.”134
In 1970, in the now-leading case of Ass’n of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp,135 the Court went a long way toward accepting
Davis’s position. In a move that scholars have traced directly to Davis’s
writings,136 the Court read an “injury in fact” test into section 702 of the
APA, associating that test with the “case or controversy” limitation
required by Article III of the Constitution.137 Then, evidently having
decided to split the difference between Davis’s view and the more
restrictive views that had prevailed in the past, the Court went on to
articulate a further requirement: the interest that the plaintiff seeks to
protect must be “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” In
subsequent case law, this latter “zone of interests” test has been applied
fairly leniently.138 “Injury in fact” is the usual focus of attention. Thus,
Davis’s victory in this area was incomplete, but he did set the basic
trajectory of the Court’s standing doctrine. What made his success
especially remarkable is that the text of section 702 did not lend itself at
all well to the construction that he induced the Court to place on it.139
133. Id. § 22.04.
134. Id. § 22.02, at 211.
135. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
136. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 256–58
(1988); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?: Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 185–86 (1992).
137. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151–54.
138. Compare Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 492 (1998) (explaining that a class of plaintiffs can have standing even if Congress
had no specific intent to benefit them; their interests need only be “arguably” protected
by the legislation at issue), with Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers
Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991) (the only case in which the Court has found that a plaintiff
could not satisfy the zone of interests test).
139. The statutory language itself predicated standing on whether the plaintiff had
suffered “legal wrong” or was adversely affected or aggrieved “within the meaning of a
relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). Manifestly, it was intended to focus on legally
defined rights. Apart from his appeal to the “simple and natural proposition” that injury
in fact should suffice for standing, 3 TREATISE § 22.18, at 291 (1st ed. 1958), Davis’s
argument to the contrary relied primarily on congressional committee reports that had
accompanied the APA. See id. § 22.02. Legislators from both Houses had explained
section 702 as conferring a right of review upon “any person adversely affected in fact
by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute.” ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 212 (1946) (House
Judiciary Committee report) (emphasis added); id. at 276 (Senate Judiciary Committee
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Few would argue that Data Processing has brought stability or
consensus to the law of standing, or resulted in the simplicity that Davis
had forecast. Davis himself became highly critical of the Court’s
performance in subsequent standing cases. He castigated the Court for
inconsistency, result-oriented manipulation, and rhetorical digressions.140
From his standpoint, the basic problem was that the Court was
wandering off into detours; if it would adhere more faithfully to the
injury in fact test, most of these ills could be cured.141 According to a
number of thoughtful commentators, however, the real problem has been
Data Processing itself.142 They argue that an “injury in fact” test cannot
possibly provide a coherent approach to the analysis of standing,
because one has to make value judgments to decide what counts as an
“injury.” Data Processing obscures those choices.143 Furthermore, it is
argued, such value judgments should lie primarily within legislative
control. Yet, by linking the injury in fact concept to Article III, the
Court’s approach has had the effect of stripping Congress of control over
standing. This implication was borne out by the Court’s controversial
decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,144 which denied standing to
environmentalists even though they had sued under a “citizen suit”
provision that purported to confer standing on “any person.”145 Thus,
despite the Court’s claims that the doctrine of standing is a restraint on
the power of the judiciary, Data Processing has been criticized as an
unwarranted judicial incursion on legislative supremacy.146 In short, the
merits of the Data Processing revolution in standing doctrine are still

report) (emphasis added). Davis’s elevation of the committee reports over the enacted
statutory text was criticized in his own day, JAFFE, supra note 13, at 528–30, and, of
course, would be an even harder sell in ours, in light of the more skeptical attitude that
today’s courts take toward legislative history. Indeed, one basis for that attitude is a fear
that interested factions will sprinkle the legislative record with unreliable, self-serving
statements. One of the earliest expressions of that fear singled out, as an example of
such abuse, statements in the legislative history of the APA about what is now section
702. Alfred F. Conard, New Ways to Write Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 458, 461 & n.13 (1947).
140. 4 TREATISE §§ 24:1, 24:35.
141. See id. §§ 24:6, at 230, 24:35, at 337.
142. Criticisms of the opinion have at times been harsh. See Richard B. Stewart,
Standing for Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1566, 1569 (1979) (book review) (viewing
Data Processing as “an unredeemed disaster”); Sunstein, supra note 136, at 185 (calling
Data Processing “a remarkably sloppy opinion”).
143. Fletcher, supra note 136, at 232–34; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia,
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1154–60 (1993); Sunstein,
supra note 136, at 188–92.
144. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
145. Stewart, supra note 142, at 1569–70 & n.47 (anticipating this result); Sunstein,
supra note 136, at 188–89 (faulting Lujan).
146. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1195–201 (1993).
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deeply contested.147 The fact remains, however, that standing has become
much more widely available today than it was when Davis began to call
for change. Despite the awkwardness of the manner in which the Court
effected its reform, Davis deserves some credit for the expansion.
Complementary to his contributions to the law of standing was
Davis’s influence regarding the timing of judicial review of agency
action. His impact on the development of the ripeness doctrine is
particularly evident. Indeed, it is reported that Davis actually coined the
term “ripeness” in administrative law; until he began writing about it in
the 1950s, it had never appeared in any federal case on administrative
law (except in descriptions of fruit).148 Of course, Davis did not
fabricate the underlying concept out of nowhere. He was reacting to a
significant body of case law in which courts had rejected challenges to
administrative action by asserting that the challenger had come to court
too soon and must wait until a later stage in the administrative process
before it could get review. As in his writing on standing, Davis
considered the case law too parsimonious about judicial review. He saw
some legitimate uses for the ripeness concept, such as where the issues
tendered to the court were poorly defined or factually undeveloped, or
where the plaintiff would suffer no substantial hardship from postponement
149
He argued, however, that courts had often turned challengers
of review.
away due to a diffuse and, he thought, excessive concern for judicial
restraint. Too often, this translated into unnecessary dismissals on artificial
grounds—such as where a statute or regulation had not actually been
applied to the challenger through an enforceable order, even though it
was causing hardship.150
The Court broke with these restrictive cases in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner.151 That case allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to go to
court to challenge a recently promulgated drug labeling regulation, even
though no enforcement proceedings had yet been initiated. On a more

147. Recent cases have tended to soften the impact of Defenders of Wildlife. See
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); FEC v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). See generally William W. Buzbee, Standing and the
Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247 (2001) (extending the debate in
light of recent developments).
148. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 166–67 & nn. 264–65 (1998).
149. 3 TREATISE §§ 21.02, 21.10, at 206 (1st ed. 1958).
150. Id. § 21.10, at 199–200.
151. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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general level, Abbott made clear that ripeness should be evaluated on a
functional basis, in terms of the fitness of the issue for immediate judicial
consideration and the hardship that challengers would experience if review
were postponed.152 The Court relied on the writings of Jaffe and Davis
as its main sources of inspiration in reaching this formulation.153 In turn,
Davis hailed the Court’s decision in Abbott for having repudiated the
restrictive holdings of the past.154 Abbott has remained the dominant
precedent defining the ripeness defense.155 To be sure, its approach to
ripeness is inherently discretionary. Holdings that particular challenges
to agency action are unripe have by no means become an extinct
species.156 But, precisely because so much does depend on discretion,
the attitude with which the doctrine is implemented is critical. Abbott’s
policy is one of liberality, and Davis’s critique of the early case law
surely contributed to it.
In an interesting way, Davis’s impact on the law of exhaustion of
administrative remedies presents a more mixed picture. In Darby v.
Cisneros,157 the Court construed the last sentence of section 704 of the
APA. That sentence provides that an agency action that is “otherwise
final” is “final for purposes of this section,” and thus judicially reviewable
immediately, regardless of whether the party seeking review has sought
reconsideration or taken an internal agency appeal. The Court concluded
that the sentence also forecloses the courts from requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies in such cases. Although this was by far the
most natural reading of section 704, the lower courts had been ignoring
the statute for years. Davis had long deplored this judicial failure to
follow the APA,158 and the Court highlighted his analysis in Darby.159
On the other hand, in Patsy v. Board of Regents,160 the Court parted
152. Id. at 148–49.
153. Id. at 148 n.15; see Duffy, supra note 148, at 175. The exact phrasing of the
Court’s test appears to owe more to Jaffe than Davis, see JAFFE, supra note 13, at 410,
423, but its substance harmonizes with the analysis in Davis’s 1958 treatise. See, e.g., 3
TREATISE § 21.10, at 206 (1st ed. 1958) (suggesting that, when substantial adverse effect
on the plaintiff is neither present nor imminent, a finding of unripeness is normally
proper, but the court should have discretion).
154. 4 TREATISE §§ 25:6, 25:16.
155. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001).
156. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
810–12 (2003); Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732–34 (1998); Toilet
Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162–63 (1967) (holding, in a case decided the
same day as Abbott, that association’s challenge was unripe because the issues presented
might well be more reliably determined in an enforcement action, and association’s
members would experience little hardship if review were postponed until that time).
157. 509 U.S. 137, 146–47 (1993).
158. 3 TREATISE § 20.08 (1st ed. 1958 & Supp. 1976).
159. Darby, 509 U.S. at 145.
160. 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
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company with Davis, ruling that a plaintiff who challenges the
constitutionality of state administrative action by bringing a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust administrative remedies
first. The Patsy holding reaffirmed prior case law that Davis had
vigorously criticized.161 It may be no coincidence that, in each of these
two cases, the Court opted for bright-line rules, as opposed to allowing
courts to make ad hoc, discretionary decisions about whether to require
exhaustion. In other words, the Court was willing to take Davis’s advice
only insofar as that advice was in tune with the formalist tendencies that
had begun to characterize the Court’s jurisprudence by the early 1980s.
As such, the two cases form part of a pattern that I will discuss in the
concluding section of this Essay.
IV. THE PRAGMATIC OPTIMIST
In this Essay, I have tried to present a candid assessment of Davis’s
impact on administrative law. It may have seemed that I have lingered
too long on ideas that did not sell, but my purpose has not been to
debunk. How many of us could boast of a better track record than his?
The shortfalls that I have mentioned say more about the extraordinary
range of topics Davis addressed than about any shortage of inspiration or
persuasive power on his part. Moreover, I suspect that the lack of a
better reception for some of his ideas is attributable, in part, to a shift in
the intellectual climate within which administrative law has been
evolving. That supposition sets the stage for me to offer some
concluding thoughts that may help to put Davis’s legacy into a larger
perspective.
In separate essays, Keith Werhan and Thomas Merrill have divided
the modern history of administrative law into three periods, each
dominated by a distinctive approach to judicial common lawmaking.162
Werhan calls these three periods, respectively, the “traditional” era, the
“interest-representation” era, and the “neoclassical” era.163 In the first
era, immediately following the enactment of the APA in 1946, courts
seemed to accept at face value one of the teachings of the “legal
process” school of jurisprudence: agencies offer significant institutional
161. TREATISE § 20.01-1 (1st ed. Supp. 1976).
162. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039 (1997); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 567 (1992).
163. Werhan, supra note 162, at 568.

343

LEVIN

4/7/2005 10:51 AM

advantages over other branches. Accordingly, judicial decisions tended
to emphasize the empowerment of administrative agencies, and removal
of “needless procedural impediments” to their work,164 so that agencies
would be equipped to pursue the public interest more effectively.165 The
second era, commencing in the middle to late 1960s, was shaped by
more skeptical views of agency power. Fears about the bureaucracy’s
tendencies toward insulation, unresponsiveness, and capture by special
interests were prevalent during this period. In Merrill’s words, courts
seemed to act on a belief that, “by changing the procedural rules that
govern agency decisionmaking and by engaging in more aggressive
review of agency decisions[,] they could free agencies to open their
doors—and their minds—to formerly unrepresented points of view . . . .”166
The third era, beginning roughly in the early 1980s, has been marked by
a general diminution in judicial common lawmaking itself, and a drift
toward formalism. As Merrill notes, “judicial innovations that would
expand the authority of the courts at the expense of agencies have almost
entirely disappeared.”167
Davis’s most active years as a scholar spanned, roughly speaking, the
first two of these eras. His contributions to the law on adjudication and
rulemaking, as detailed above, can be linked to the first era, as they
related primarily to the empowerment of agencies.168 His writings on
control of discretion and on judicial review have a closer relationship to
the second era, as they were concerned with the establishment of firmer
controls over agencies.169 In turn, Merrill’s and Werhan’s accounts of
the third era may help to explain why the courts, in recent years, have
seemed wary of embracing some of Davis’s ideas.
Davis was a product of the legal process school,170 with a strong dose
164. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1049.
165. See id. at 1041, 1048–50; Werhan, supra note 162, at 576–83.
166. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1043; see id. at 1050–52; Werhan, supra note 162,
at 583–90.
167. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1041; see id. at 1053–55; Werhan, supra note 162,
at 590–607; see also Duffy, supra note 148, at 212–13 (arguing that the era of common
lawmaking in administrative law, as fostered by Davis and others, has passed).
168. See Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law
and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1408–09
(2000) (discussing how Davis’s writings in the 1950s argued for a pluralist vision of
administrative agencies’ legitimacy, contemplating only a limited role for judicial
supervision).
169. Id. at 1414–15 (explaining how, as interest group pluralism declined in the
mid-1960s and thereafter, Davis became a proponent of broader standing principles and
of closer judicial oversight of agencies); Merrill, supra note 162, at 1062–63 (noting
Davis’s call in Discretionary Justice for stronger legal standards to structure agency
discretion, and characterizing the book’s strident tone as an embodiment of the “agitated
and activist” mood of the 1960s).
170. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal
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of legal realism mixed in.171 He had little if any use for the formalist
tendencies and rhetoric of judicial restraint that have come to be
characteristic of our day. Pragmatism, purposive interpretation, and
respect for judicial creativity were pillars of his intellectual framework.172
He made his perspective abundantly clear in what appears to have been
his final scholarly appearance in the law reviews—the transcript of a
conference in 1990 sponsored by the Federalist Society.173 With
characteristic bluntness and audacity, Davis took issue with a statement
in the conference brochure, in which the Society had declared that “it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law
is, and not what it should be.” To Davis, this was simply nonsense:
A main reason I accepted the invitation is to try to persuade the Society that in
the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say both what the law is,
and what it should be.
My position is entirely conservative; it is in full agreement with judicial
practice that has long been uniform and deeply established. Anglo-American
courts for centuries have been creating new law to answer new questions, reexamining and sometimes changing initial answers in light of later and better
understanding, responding to new legislative facts that affect the lawmaking,
and reconsidering and sometimes changing established law in the light of later
or better understanding.
....
After spending half a century studying administrative law, I believe that many
of the most valuable portions of administrative law are wholly the product of
judicial creativity. Nearly all of today’s administrative law has been created
during the past half century. If the Federalist Society’s opposition to judicial
creativity had prevailed, the most valuable portions of today’s administrative
law could not have come into existence.174

Flowing as they did from these jurisprudential premises, many of
Davis’s recommendations, including several that I have discussed above,
were unlikely candidates for incorporation into a “neoclassical” body of
administrative law. For example, I have already referred to his harsh critique
of Vermont Yankee.175 He considered that case’s disavowal of judicially
Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2049 & n.111 (1994).
171. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 19, 121, 124–
27 (2000) (associating Davis with the legal realists’ belief in the inevitability and
necessity of administrative governance, as part of the legacy of the New Deal).
172. Duffy, supra note 148, at 119, 135–36.
173. Symposium, The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and
Shared Powers: Panel V, The Role of the Courts in Separation of Powers Disputes, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 676–81 (1990) (remarks of Kenneth Culp Davis).
174. Id. at 676–77.
175. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
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prescribed procedures in rulemaking to be unworkable and contrary to
precedent and the intent of the APA. But the Court was deaf to this
critique. Indeed, in 1990 the Court indicated that Vermont Yankee principles
apply to adjudication as well as to rulemaking.176 The Court reached this
decision in a surprisingly casual fashion, and despite ample room to
doubt that the stated reasoning of Vermont Yankee was applicable.177
The main explanation for this extension had to be the Court’s aversion to
unconstrained judicial activism in the realm of administrative procedure.
To take another salient example, Davis was predictably dismayed by
the Court’s decision in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.178 Chevron set forth (or at least appeared to have
set forth) an across-the-board requirement of substantial deference to
agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they administer. Davis’s own
thinking about the scope of judicial review of agency action was freeform and pragmatic. He found the verbiage of the case law unhelpful
and thought the real law in this area could be reduced to a single
generalization: “Courts usually substitute judgment on the kind of
questions of law that are within their special competence, but on other
questions they limit themselves to deciding reasonableness; they do not
clarify the meaning of reasonableness but retain full discretion in each
case to stretch it in either direction.”179 Post-Chevron, he declared that
the deferential attitude prescribed in that case was an outright abdication
of the judicial task of deciding relevant questions of law.180
The divergence between Davis’s views and those of modern courts
reflects not only competing jurisprudential theories but also contrasting
attitudes. Merrill and Werhan suggest, as do others,181 that the formalism of
the neoclassical age is largely attributable to burgeoning cynicism about
government as a whole, including the courts themselves.182 “For whatever
reason,” says Merrill, “the recent era has been characterized by widespread
pessimism about the capacity of any governmental institution to achieve
176. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–56 (1990).
177. In Vermont Yankee the Court had been able to argue, with some credibility,
that Congress itself had determined the appropriate degree of formality for rulemaking.
See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
523, 547 (1978) (noting that section 553 of the APA “enacted ‘a formula upon which
opposing social and political forces have come to rest’”) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)). The APA contains no analogous template for
informal adjudication. It contemplates that, except in “formal” cases, procedures in
adjudicative cases will be determined outside the APA itself.
178. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see TREATISE ch. 29 (Supp. 1989).
179. 5 TREATISE § 29:1, at 332 (emphasis omitted).
180. TREATISE § 29:16-1 to 29:16-4 (Supp. 1989).
181. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23–25 (1997).
182. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1044, 1054; Werhan, supra note 162, at 608, 615–16.
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results that will promote the public interest. In effect, capture theory’s
pessimism about the performance of administrative agencies has been
generalized to include all political institutions.”183 Thus, modern doctrine
proceeds from an unarticulated premise that, if both courts and agencies
are unreliable champions of the public interest, or susceptible to manipulation
by organized groups, the rules of the game might as well be as simple
and mechanical as possible.184
Davis, however, was no cynic. His writing continually suggested that
matters could be handled satisfactorily, if other people would only listen
to good advice. His scholarship is full of solutions—some probably farfetched,
many extremely sensible—but no fatalism or resignation. He was not a
partisan of either courts or agencies vis-à-vis each other, but he was quite
optimistic about what they could achieve together if properly advised.
For many of us who learned administrative law under his tutelage, or
have found guidance in his writing, that optimism and idealism will
remain an inspiration. From this standpoint, a rereading of generous
portions of Davis’s work is highly recommended. It can be a great tonic.
It is not only intellectually stimulating, but also spiritually bracing. In
today’s environment, we see many examples of partisan conflict, the
breakdown of traditional boundaries and norms, and diminished trust in
the state. Supporters of administrative governance who find themselves
jaded or discouraged by all this should not forget where at least one
antidote can be found. It’s in the book.

183. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1053. One might ask whether the adoption of some
of Davis’s teachings itself contributed to this reaction. Probably the strongest case along
these lines would focus on his role in encouraging broader judicial review, especially
broader standing, with its attendant empowerment of public interest groups. Conceivably,
too, agencies’ broader use of rulemaking, as encouraged by Davis and others, has had
some fallout by making governmental requirements more forceful and salient. Cf. Jim
Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A Rulemaking Revolution or
Counter-Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997) (discussing a “counter-revolution”
in Florida, leading to imposition of heavy-handed curbs on the rulemaking process, soon
after that state adopted a statute that required agencies to favor rulemaking where
feasible and practicable). On the whole, however, my sense is that the pessimism about
judicial creativity in modern legal thinking has far less to do with these influences than
with ideological struggles rooted primarily in constitutional law. See Werhan, supra
note 162, at 620.
184. Merrill, supra note 162, at 1044.
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